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Contracts
By Mitchel P. House, Jr.*

During the survey period, the appellate courts of Georgia reviewed approximately 80 cases involving problems of contract law. As is usually the
case, the great majority of the cases merely applied well-settled principles.
Many turned on procedural points. While none have truly landmark
significance, a few are worthy of discussion in that they present interesting
problems in the application of established principles to new situations.
In Busbee v. Georgia Conference, American Ass'n of University
Professors,' certain faculty members at institutions of the University System of Georgia sought an adjudication that certain employment contracts
entered into by the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia
were valid and binding. In January of 1975, the General Assembly had
appropriated to the Board of Regents $223 million for personal services at
its instructional institutions. Upon the Governor's approval of the General
Appropriations Act,2 the Board of Regents commenced executing contracts
with many of its faculty members increasing their 1975-76 salaries over
their 1974-75 salaries by varying amounts. When it became apparent to the
Governor that the revenue estimate upon which the Appropriations Act
was based was excessive, he called a special session of the General Assembly. Its amendment 3 of the General Appropriations Act included a reduction of the money originally appropriated to fund salary increases for employees of the Board of Regents. The Board thereupon announced that
faculty members who received contracts containing salary increases would
only be paid their 1974-75 salaries without the agreed upon increases.
The Georgia Supreme Court, with Justices Hall and Jordan dissenting,
held that those faculty employment contracts entered into between the
date of approval of the Appropriations Act and the date of approval of the
amendatory act were valid and binding on the Board of Regents and that
not paying them according to their written salary terms constituted a
breach of the contracts.4 The court found the applicable rule to be correctly
* Member of the firm of McKenna, House, Lancaster & Green, Macon, Georgia. Mercer
University (A.B. 1956; LL.B. 1959); Member of the Georgia Bar.
1. 235 Ga. 752, 221 S.E.2d 437 (1975).
2. Ga. Laws, 1975, p. 1333.
3. Ga. Laws, 1975, Ex. Sess., p. 1734.
4. The court rejected the contention of the Board that it had sovereign immunity and was
therefore not subject to being sued. The court held the Board to be a person in law, able to
sue and be sued, with no sovereign immunity in a suit for breach of the express terms of a
contract into which it was authorized to enter and did enter.
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stated in Bank of Norman Park v. Colquitt County:5 "[A] repealing Act
will not be given a retroactive operation, so as to divest previously acquired
rights, or to impair the obligation of a contract lawfully made by virtue of
and pending the existence of the law repealed."' The court reasoned that
the State could adequately protect itself against reoccurrence of this situation by contract or by statute, while persons contracting unconditionally
with the state are unable to assure themselves of protection against depropriation of the sums contracted.
The Board of Regents unsuccessfully contended that even if there had
been an impairment of the contracts, such impairment was constitutionally permissible in that the state's economic interest may justify some
impairment of the obligation of contracts. The Regents cited Home
Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,7 in which the U. S. Supreme Court
upheld the Minnesota moratorium law enacted during the severe economic
difficulties of the depression. The law imposed a two-year moratorium on
mortgage foreclosures while still requiring mortgagors to pay rent. The
Georgia Supreme Court declined to apply Blaisdell, because the amended
Appropriations Act was not temporary and there was no showing of economic necessity comparable to the depression of the 1930's.
The court declined, however, to declare the amendatory act unconstitutional as an impairment of the obligation of the contracts in question. It
stated that the plaintiffs had failed to show that the amended Act had
impaired the ability of the Board of Regents to meet the obligation of these
contracts. The court felt that the Board either may have the necessary
money to meet its contractual obligations, or if not, could possibly obtain
it. It concluded that the amended Act would not be subject to constitutional attack on grounds of impairment until efforts to obtain the money
were exhausted.
I.

PAROL EVIDENCE

The permissible role of parol evidence in the construction of a contract
is adequately stated as follows:
It has long been the law of this state that parol e%;idence will not be
considered to add to, take from or vary a written contract. The attendant
and surrounding circumstances may be proved, and if there is an ambiguity, latent or patent, it may be explained . . . but a construction which

will uphold a contract in whole and in every part is to be preferred. . ..
Thus no construction is required or even permissible when the language
employed by the parties in their contract is plain, unambigious, and capable of only one reasonable interpretation. In such instances, the language
5.
6.
7.

169 Ga. 534, 150 S.E. 841 (1929).
235 Ga. at 762, 221 S.E.2d at 444.
290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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used must be afforded its literal meaning and plain ordinary words given
their usual significance.'
In Clark v. Peck,9 the court of appeals declared that parol evidence is
admissible to supply a missing element of an incomplete contract where
it is manifest that the writing was not intended to speak the whole contract. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in permitting the defendant
to introduce specifications that purportedly had been given to the plaintiff
at a time reasonably contemporaneous with the execution of the written
contract, that referred to the same house and that provided a missing
portion of an obviously incomplete contract.
In Ansley v. Forest Services, Inc.,10 a salesman leased certain heavy
equipment to a father and son partnership, representing that the contract
included credit life insurance on the father in the amount of $25,000. The
contract itself stated that life insurance was not included. The court first
acknowledged the correctness of the following principles:
[1] [A] distinct collateral oral agreement which is not inconsistent
with the written contract is not necessarily merged therein and one contract may be the consideration of another, and such an independent oral
agreement which has been so induced, may be proved and enforced though
not referred to in the written contract ....
[21 [11f the writing does not purport to contain the entire contract,
parol evidence is permissible to prove the other portions thereof which are
not inconsistent with the writing . . . ,'
It then held that neither of these rules is applicable where, as here, parol
evidence of a prior or contemporaneous agreement not incorporated in the
writing contradicts or changes the terms of a valid written contract.
In Wilson v. Sheppard,'2 the court held that cases where parol evidence
is permissible to explain the capacity in which a party signed a contract,
though different from the capacity designation appearing below or after
the signature, are not controlling where the body of the contract explicitly
limits the capacity of the party. Here, the plaintiff sought to hold one of
the defendants as surety notwithstanding the fact that the body of the
contract specifically negated the claim of suretyship in spelling out why
the defendant in question was a party.
In Tatum v. Bank of Cumming, 3 the court applied the rule that introduction of a promissory note in evidence establishes a prima facie case
8. R. S. Helms, Inc. v. GST Development Co., 135 Ga. App. 845, 847, 219 S.E.2d 458,
460-61 (1975).
9. 134 Ga. App. 868, 216 S.E.2d 671 (1975).
10. 135 Ga. App. 745, 218 S.E.2d 914 (1975).
11. Id. at 747, 218 S.E.2d at 916.
12. 136 Ga. App. 475, 221 S.E.2d 671 (1975).
13. 135 Ga. App. 675, 218 S.E.2d 677 (1975).
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which cannot be rebutted by parol evidence. The court explained the reason for this rule as follows: "Because the note contains an unconditional
promise, the contract is complete as it was written; parol evidence may not
be used to inject conditions on the obligation which are not apparent from
14
the face of the note."
When a contract itself provides that any changes in the contract must
be in writing, the language in the contract might serve to prevent any parol
changes or modifications of that contract, but it would not control any new
or subsequent agreements. Even if the contract provides it may not be
changed except by writing, parties may, by mutual consent, enter into a
new agreement at variance with the prior one. 5
In McGraw v. Trusco Leasing, Inc.," the defendants had executed a
separate guarantee of the corporate lessee's undertaking to lease certain
equipment. One defendant contended that his individual guarantee was
induced by plaintiff's oral promise to satisfy a certain indebtedness and
that the consideration for his guarantee had failed when plaintiff breached
his promise. The defendant sought to justify the parol evidence he offered
by invoking the rule that allows such evidence to show actual consideration
or lack of it when such is in dispute in cases where the agreement simply
recites "for value received." The court thwarted his effort by pointing out
that such an ambiguity may not be used as the vehicle for introducing
parol evidence to vary the express terms of an agreement. Here the stated
consideration for the guarantee was the making of the lease agreement with
the corporate lessee and the promise upon which the complaining defendant relied was extrinsic of the instrument and therefore inadmissible to
contradict or vary the terms of that instrument.
The case of ContractorsManagement Corp. v. McDowel-Kelley, Inc. ,"7
stands for the proposition that a written agreement may be modified by a
subsequent oral agreement but parol evidence of the latter is still clearly
inadmissible to vary the terms of a valid written contract. The court
stated:
Modification of a partly executed written contract occurs when the parties
to that contract agree to change its terms. The agreement to substitute a
third party for one of the nominal parties to the contract is a separate
contract, having as its consideration the release of one of the nominal
parties from his obligations on the original contract. This was not strictly
a modification of the original contract. Moreover, such an agreement must
be supported by valuable consideration. 8
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id., 218 S.E.2d at 678.
Wood v. Yancey Bros. Co., 135 Ga. App. 720, 218 S.E.2d 698 (1975).
137 Ga. App. 328, 223 S.E.2d 731 (1975).
136 Ga. App. 116, 220 S.E.2d 473 (1975).
Id. at 119, 220 S.E.2d at 476.
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In declaring this contract to be clearly not ambiguous, the court defined
that term in the parol-evidence context of Georgia Code §38-502 as referring to "words or phrases of duplicitous, indistinct or uncertain meanings
which may fairly be understood in more ways than one."' 9
II.

MUTUALITY

When mutual promises are relied upon as the sole consideration to support a contract, the promises must be mutually binding and enforceable. 0
In City of Atlanta v. Foster & Cooper, Inc.,2 the city argued that it had
not executed the contract and therefore there was no contract. The court
pointed out that while one of the purposes of a signature to a contract is
to afford mutuality, it is not the only method of obtaining mutuality. Part
performance by both parties satisfies the requisites of mutuality and the
statute of frauds. Here, the plaintiff had already incurred expense in obtaining insurance and bonds required by the city and the city had adopted
a resolution awarding the contract to the plaintiff.
The test of mutuality of a contract is to be made at the time it is to be
enforced. Where a contract is contingent upon the meeting of some condition, it is not enforceable by either party until that condition has been met.
At that time the lack of mutuality is cured. Consequently, an action for
specific performance was held to lie to enforce a contract after the condition precedent for the closing of the sale (receipt of a deed from the Secretary of the Interior) had been met, even though the contract would have
been lacking in mutuality and too uncertain to enforce at any time prior
to the receipt of the deed, which had the effect of curing the uncertainty
22
and lack of mutuality.
In Alodex Corp. v. Brawner,2 the court held a contract to be null and
void by reason of lack of mutuality because a condition contained therein
(obtaining suitable financing) made the contract contingent upon an event
which may or may not happen at the pleasure of the buyer. The court
reasoned that no obligation would arise until that contingency occurred.
Another case in which mutuality was found lacking is CharterInvestment & Development Co. v. Urban Medical Services, Inc. 2 The court of
appeals held that "[clontracts dependent upon a decision as to whether
a cost to be determined in the future is feasible in the untrammeled discretion of one party are generally lacking in mutuality."
An assertion that an employment contract was void for lack of mutuality
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 118, 220 S.E.2d at 475.
6 E.G.L. Contracts §39 (1963).
136 Ga. App. 159, 220 S.E.2d 414 (1975).
Moore v. Buiso, 235 Ga. 730, 221 S.E.2d 414 (1975).
134 Ga. App. 630, 215 S.E.2d 527 (1975).
136 Ga. App. 297, 220 S.E.2d 784 (1975).
Id. at 298, 220 S.E.2d at 785.
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was not sustained in Landmark FinancialServices, Inc. v. Tarpley.26 The
employee felt that only he had made promises under the contract. The
court, however, found adequate consideration by both parties sufficient to
sustain mutuality, since the contract provided for duties to be performed
by the employee and for definite compensation to be paid by the employer.
The court pointed out that the fact that the employee agreed to further
restrictions (here a restrictive covenant not to engage in competition with
the employer after termination of the employee's employment) not placed
upon the employer did not divest the contract of mutuality.
III.

NOVATION

In several cases, either the court or one of the parties relied upon "novation," sometimes failing to perceive the difference between a "novation"
and mere "departure" from the terms of a contract. The distinction is
clearly stated as follows:
Any change in the nature or terms of a contract is called a novation and
if based on a new consideration or if new parties are introduced, so as to
change the person to whom the obligation is due, the original contract is
discharged.
A departure from the terms of a contract differs from a novation of the
contract because under a departure, one party can hold the other party
to the strict terms of the agreement after reasonable notice of such intention has been given; but under a novation there can be no return to the
original terms of the contract.'
In Edwards v. Gold Kist, Inc.,"8 the defendant contracted to purchase
soy bean meal from the plaintiff for delivery in August, 1973. The soy bean
meal was purchased on speculation, and the defendant did not supply
shipping instructions by August 31, 1973. The parties then agreed to an
additional carrying charge on the August meal, and the contract was extended through September 30, 1973. No further communications occurred
until about October 15, 1973, when the defendant informed the plaintiff
that he would not provide shipping instructions or take the meal. The court
held the contract as modified by change and consideration was a novation
under Georgia Code §20-115, which provides, in effect, that a simple contract as to the same matter based on a new consideration will discharge
the original contract.
In Crawford v. First National Bank of Rome,"9 the bank foreclosed on
Crawford's property. She alleged a "novation" in defense; the bank's acceptance of installment payments on the note after the due date, according
26.
27.
28.
29.

236 Ga. 568, 224 S.E.2d 736 (1976).
6 E.G.L. Contracts §108 (1963).
137 Ga. App. 42, 223 S.E.2d 12 (1975).
137 Ga. App. 294, 223 S.E.2d 488 (1976).
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to plaintiff, effected a departure from the original contract. The failure of
the bank to give notice to her, in accordance with Georgia Code §20-116,3
of an intention to rely upon the exact terms of the contract forms the basis
of the suit. The court agreed that a quasi-new agreement arises where the
parties mutually depart from the terms of the original agreement and pay
or receive money under such departure. It stated, however, that such departure must be mutual; there must be more than a simple breach on the
part of one of the parties. According to the court, evidence that Crawford
received past-due notices and that the bank exacted the payment of a late
charge when delayed installments were accepted manifested an intent on
the part of the bank to demand and enforce strict compliance with the
terms of the contract. The mere fact that the bank accepted installment
payments after they were due, without any subsequent agreement to do so
and without any consideration therefor, was not such a departure from the
original contract as to require notice of an intention to comply with the
strict terms thereof before the bank could insist upon a forfeiture. Here the
bank also accepted a partial payment on the note after Crawford had
received the notice of default. She contended that this amounted to a
waiver of the prior default, but the court observed that the bank merely
received what it was already due under the terms of the original agreement.
Because there was no additional consideration for forbearance in declaring
the entire debt due or in extending the time of payments, the bank could
and did legally enforce the express default and foreclosure provisions of the
note.
In Trust Co. of Georgia v. Montgomery, 31 the bank brought suit against
the defendant for the deficiency balance owing on a conditional sales contract on an automobile after the automobile's repossession and sale. The
trial judge made the following finding of fact and judgment:
Twice the defendant was 30 days late in this (sic) payments, twice he was
four months behind in his payments and once he was five months behind.
There was no notice from the plaintiff to the defendant that a strict
compliance of (sic) the original terms would be insisted
upon. Therefore,
2
judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant.
The court of appeals reversed and held that the mere fact that the plaintiff
accepted late payments from the defendant on five different occasions did
not constitute a waiver of the contract provisions relating to timeliness of
payments in view of the contractual clause which specifically provided
30. GA. CODE ANN. §20-116 (1965) provides: "Where parties, in the course of the execution
of a contract, depart from its terms and pay or receive money under such departure, before
either can recover for failure to pursue the letter of the agreement, reasonable notice must
be given the other of intention to rely on the exact terms of the agreement. Until such notice,
the departure is a quasi new agreement."
31. 136 Ga. App. 742, 222 S.E.2d 196 (1975).
32. Id., 222 S.E.2d at 197.
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against modification or waiver in such circumstances.13 Judge Evans, in his
dissenting opinion, said it seemed to be the bank's contention that it could
write words into the contract that would prevent the application of the
principle of "novation." The dissent felt that the language relied on by
plaintiff "flies directly into the face of the public policy of this state, and
especially into the face of Code §20-116."'
In Biltmore Construction Co. v. Tri-State Electrical Contractors,Inc. ,3
the court construed the following provisions of law:
[1] It has long been the law of this State that the provisions of a building contract requiring a written change order before beginning work for
which recovery is sought are valid and binding provisions ...
[2] However, where the parties by a course of conduct have departed
from the terms of the contract and operated without prior written change
orders, there may be a waiver, or oral variation of the provisions of the
contract ...
[3] Where a contract prescribes conditions precedent to a party's right
to set up a cause of action or defense, and the terms are reasonable, the
opposite party may usually successfully plead a failure to comply with the
conditions, as a reason for the court's refusal to entertain the action or
defense ...
[4] But forfeiture of rights is not favored, and the courts will readily
seize upon circumstances arising in the subsequent conduct or transactions of the parties and imply a waiver, in order to prevent a forfeiture
because of non-compliance with formal prerequisites.3
Plaintiff subcontractor sought recovery of money expended for extra labor
and material allegedly required by the oral instructions of defendant general contractor's superintendent. The court ruled that the ratification of
oral instructions of the superintendent in this particular instance was sufficient to indicate to the subcontractor that he had authority to give oral
instructions to begin work on a change before the receipt of a written
change order. The court felt that, by such actions, the general contractor
had waived its right to insist upon the strict terms of the contract concerning prior written authority.
IV.

VOID CONTRACTS

In Hodges v. Community Loan & Investment Corp.," the Georgia Su33. The clause provided: "It is agreed that the waiver or indulgence of any default or the
failure to exercise any right hereunder shall not be construed as an agreement to modify the
terms of this instrument or to operate as a waiver of any subsequent default. It is further
agreed that this instrument contains the entire agreement of the parties and that it may be
modified or altered only in writing."
34. 136 Ga. App. at 745, 222 S.E.2d at 198.
35. 137 Ga. App. 504, 224 S.E.2d 487 (1976).
36. Id. at 506, 224 S.E.2d at 488-89.
37. 234 Ga. 427, 216 S.E.2d 274 (1975).
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preme Court applied the penalty provision of the Industrial Loan Act,38
which provides:
Any person who shall make loans under the provisions of Chapter 25-3,
the Georgia Industrial Loan Act, without first obtaining a license or who
shall make a false statement under oath in an application for a license
thereunder, or who shall do business while the license of such person under
such Chapter is finally suspended or revoked, or who shall knowingly
charge, contract for, receive and collect charges in excess of those permitted by such Chapter shall be punished as for a misdemeanor. Any loan
contract made in violation of such Chapter shall be null and void.

The supreme court reversed the court of appeals, which had held that only
the interest and other charges created by a contract in violation of the Act
are forfeited and that recovery could be had of the principal in a suit for
money had and received. The supreme court stated:
There is no logic in holding that where the General Assembly has declared
that a loan contract made in violation of the Industrial Loan Act is void,
this means that only the interest and other charges created by the contract
are forfeited. The contract requires the payment of the principal amount
of the loan just as much as it requires the payment of interest and other
charges. If the General Assembly declares a contract void, then the entire
obligation is void unless specific language in the statute allows partial
recovery.
The effect of the opinion of the Court of Appeals is to impose an inconsequential penalty for the violation of the Industrial Loan Act. Under that
view the lender who violates the Act is permitted to recover its principal,
with interest thereon at 7%. This surely was not what was intended by the
unequivocal language declaring contracts made in violation of the statute
to be null and void.
We conclude that the unambigious language of Code Ann. §25-9903
requires a holding that a contract made in violation of the Industrial Loan
Act is null and void and that no recovery can be had of the principal in a
suit for money had and received."'
In another case,40 a contract was declared null and void for failure to
comply with the portion of the Industrial Loan Act that requires that "'a
copy of the loan contract or a written itemized statement in the English
Language' be delivered to the borrower showing in clear terms, among
other things, 'the amount of each class of insurance carried and the premiums paid.' "' Here an examination of the loan agreement clearly showed
a request for credit life and disability insurance and the amount of prem38.
39.
40.
(1976).
41.

GA. CODE ANN. §25-9903 (1976) (emphasis added).

234 Ga. at 431, 216 S.E.2d at 277.
Household Finance Corp. of Atlanta v. Rogers, 137 Ga. App. 315, 223 S.E.2d 462
Id. at 318, 223 S.E.2d at 464, citing GA. CODE ANN. §25-319 (1976).
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iums for the same. Nowhere in the contract, however, was the amount of
insurance thus purchased shown.2
In Hughes Motor Co. v. FirstNational Bank of Atlanta,4 3 the defendant
contended that the entire contract was void because it contained an unconstitutional provision stipulating that upon default, the lessor may terminate the lease, take possession of the equipment for his own purposes, and
may, "with or without legal process and employing all such force as may
be necessary,"enter and seize it from any premises on which it is located.
The court held:
The illegality of an option not in fact used does not render the entire
contract void unless a statute makes it so. For example, there can be no
recovery under the Industrial Loan Act for a usurious loan because Code
§25-9903 specifically provides that loan contracts in violation thereof shall
be null and void.
...The questionable enforceability of this provision is immaterial in
view of the posture of the case, since no seizure was effected."
The alleged contract in Berry v. Discount Lumber & Supply Co.15 was
held to be void for uncertainty because the written contract did not include
or refer to the plans and specifications for the construction of the residence
on the lot.
In Hazen v. Rich's, Inc. , the plaintiff brought suit against Rich's for an
alleged wrongful detention and arrest. Rich's filed a special plea, among
other defenses, that plaintiff had, "while represented by counsel, executed
a general release in favor of defendant in consideration of one dollar ($1.00)
and other good and valuable consideration," by reason of which the claim
was barred. The plaintiff contended that the release was "signed as a result
of coercion and duress and without consideration." 7 He testified that an
attorney for Rich's threatened to have him put back in jail if he did not
sign the release and that his fear of incarceration motivated him to consent
to the release. The plaintiff also testified that the same attorney promised
him that the criminal charges, which plaintiff contended were without
foundation, would be dismissed if he signed the release.
The court found the plaintiffs allegations sufficient to form a proper
factual basis for a finding of duress and stated that:
42. For a similar result, see Dukes v. Household Finance Corp. of Marietta, 137 Ga. App.
474, 224 S.E.2d 107 (1976).
43. 136 Ga. App. 295, 220 S.E.2d 782 (1975).
44. Id. at 296, 220 S.E.2d at 783.
45. 235 Ga. 320, 219 S.E.2d 434 (1975).
46. 137 Ga. App. 258, 223 S.E.2d 290 (1976).
47. GA. CODE ANN. §20-503 (1965) provides: "The free assent of the parties being essential
to a valid contract, duress, either of imprisonment or by threats, or other acts, by which the
free will of the party is restrained and his consent induced, will render the contract voidable
at the instance of the injured party. Legal imprisonment, if not used for illegal purposes, is
not duress."
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[1] Duress consists in any illegal imprisonment, or legal imprisonment
used for an illegal purpose, or threats of bodily or other harm, or other
means amounting to coercion or tending to coerce the will of another, and
actually inducing him to do an act contrary to his free will ....
[2] [There is] no authority for the proposition that duress cannot exist
where the actor is aided by counsel. 8
The plaintiff also contended that the agreement lacked valid consideration
because the actual consideration for the release was the dismissal of the
criminal charges. The court ruled that the release would be invalid if the
dismissal of the criminal charges brought against the plaintiff by Rich's
was its sole consideration, because "[a] contract to suppress a criminal
prosecution, for a consideration personal to the prosecutor, is immoral and
contrary to public policy."49 The court held that the validity of the release
depended upon issues of fact to be determined by a jury.

V.

FRAUD

In Key v. Bagen, 50 the plaintiff alleged misrepresentation and breach of
warranty in the sale of the horse Lilting Heart after learning that the horse
was unsuitable for his daughter. The trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss. The court of appeals reversed upon finding the allegations
of fact sufficient to meet the particularity requirement of the Civil Practice
Act §9.51 The plaintiff alleged that defendant agents represented the horse
to be safe, suitable to learn equitation, and so well behaved that even a
novice might ride her without difficulty. He further alleged that the representations were made within the scope of their authority, that the agents
knew the horse was being purchased for a young girl to ride and learn
equitation and that they knew the horse was unsuitable for that purpose.
The court held these allegations to be "sufficient affirmance of fact stating
the circumstances which constituted fraud and misrepresentation in this
case."52
Many contracts contain a disclaimer provision that generally reads substantially as follows: "This instrument constitutes the entire agreement
between the parties and other representations, inducements, promises or
agreements, oral or otherwise, not embodied herein, shall not be binding
upon the parties hereto. ' 53 In one case, 5 the court applied the following
principles:
48. 137 Ga. App. at 259-60, 223 S.E.2d at 292.
49. Id. at 261, 223 S.E.2d at 293.
50. 136 Ga. App. 373, 221 S.E.2d 234 (1975).
51. GA. CODE ANN. §81A-109(b) provides: "In all averments of fraud or mistake, the
circumstance constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity."
52. 136 Ga. App. at 374, 221 S.E.2d at 235.
53. Kot v. Richard P. Rita Personnel System International, Inc., 134 Ga. App. 438, 214
S.E.2d 690 (1975).
54. Id.
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[1] Where the purchaser of personal property has been injured by the
false and fraudulent representations of the seller as to the subject matter
thereof, he ordinarily has an election whether to rescind the contract,
return the article, and sue in tort for fraud and deceit, or whether to affirm
the contract, retain the article, and seek damages resulting from the
fraudulent misrepresentation ....
[2] Thus, where a purchaser has been induced to enter a contract by
the false and fraudulent representations of the seller, he can recover damages in tort if he rescinds the contract and returns (or offers to return) the
goods purchased ....
[31 On the other hand, where the purchaser affirms a contract which
contains a merger or disclaimer provision and retains the purchased articles, he is estopped from asserting that he relied upon the seller's misrepresentation and his action for fraud must fail ....
[4] Likewise, where the buyer demonstrates that he rescinded the contract on account of antecedent fraud and offered to return the purchased
product to the seller, a legal defense to a seller's contract action is established notwithstanding the existence of a merger clause within the rescinded contract ....
[5] But where the purchaser failed to rescind the contract, a plea of
fraud in the procurement constitutes no defense to the seller's action on
the contract if a disclaimer provision is contained therein."
The court held that if a buyer is to escape the disclaimer provision of a
contract allegedly procured by fraud, it is imperative that he rescind the
contract and offer to restore to the seller the purchased articles. It further
stated that it is the fact of an effective rescission and continuing tender
which will take a case out of the category of those decisions holding that a
buyer is precluded from recovery for fraudulent misrepresentations occurring during purchase negotiations when he subsequently signs a contract
containing a disclaimer of any warranties except those expressed in writing.
In Gilreath v. Argo, 5 the defendant's contention at trial was that their
original lessor committed fraud by telling them that if certain equipment
needed repairs, a certain identified individual would fix it. One of the
defendants testified that the original lessor's statement was made after the
lease had been signed. The court found the exclusion of testimony to this
effect not to be error and pointed out that "[flraud which constitutes a
ground for voiding a contract under Code §20-502 must be fraud which
induced the parties to enter the contract [and that] the representation
which forms the basis for the fraud must relate to an existing fact and not
' 57
a future event, i.e., that someone will make the repairs when needed.
In Ansley v. Forest Services, Inc., 51 a salesman represented that there
55. Id. at 438-39, 214 S.E.2d at 691.
56. 135 Ga. App. 849, 219 S.E.2d 461 (1975).
57. Id. at 851, 219 S.E.2d at 463-64.
58. 135 Ga. App. 745, 218 S.E.2d 914 (1975).
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would be life insurance on the father of a father-son partnership in the
amount of $25,000 in connection with a lease agreement for certain heavy
equipment. The lease agreement itself expressly provided that life insurance was not included. There was no dispute that the representation had
been made and that it was false, but the salesman contended that it was
innocently made. The father died and the plaintiff discovered that there
was no credit insurance. The court held:
Where one who can read signs a contract without apprising himself of
its contents, otherwise than by accepting representations made by the
opposite party or its agent, with whom there exists no fiduciary or confidential relation, he cannot recover for damages occasioned by the breach
of the representation made where the representation made is contrary to
the express terms of the contract; unless it should appear that at the time
he signed it some such emergency existed as would excuse his failure to
read it, or that his failure to read it was brought about by some misleading
artifice or device perpetrated by the opposite party, amounting to actual
fraud such as would reasonably prevent him from reading it. . . . Fraud
which would relieve a party who can read must be fraud which prevents
him from reading.5'
The plaintiff further argued that the fact that the reference to noncoverage of life insurance was on the back side and not the face side of the
contract misled and deceived him and that such arrangement was fraudulent and deceptive. The court concluded otherwise.
°
In Cochran v. Murrah,1
another misrepresentation case, the plaintiff
was a farm employee of the defendant who was injured by a tractor driven
by the defendant. On deposition, the plaintiff testified that the defendant
paid a small doctor's bill for him and salary for three weeks even though
he was unable to work. According to the plaintiff's testimony, the defendant told the plaintiff that his insurance company was going to send some
papers for the plaintiff to sign so the defendant could be reimbursed the
money he had paid the doctor. The plaintiff testified that the defendant
told him that the insurance would pay the medical bills and would pay the
plaintiff so long as he remained unable to work. About three weeks after
the accident, the defendant brought the papers out to the plaintiff's house
and told him to sign them. The plaintiff testified that he got up out of bed
to sign the papers, that he was still on pain pills, and that he signed
without reading them. The plaintiff can read but testified that he never
does. The papers consisted of an agreement and release by which the
plaintiff released the defendant and his insurance company from any and
all claims arising out of the accident in exchange for $248.74 paid to the
plaintiff and a promise to pay his future medical expenses for one year up
59.
60.

Id. at 748, 218 S.E.2d at 916.
235 Ga. 304, 219 S.E.2d 421 (1975).
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to a total of $1,000. The plaintiff moved out of the house on the defendant's
farm where he had previously lived without charge when he was told to
begin paying rent of $50 a month. The plaintiff filed suit against the
defendant and the defendant's insurance company for cancellation of the
release and payment of his salary of $70 a week plus his medical expenses,
less payments previously made to him. The court applied the following
confidentiality principles:
[1] The Rule in this state is that where one who can read signs a contract without reading it, he is bound by the terms thereof, unless he can
show that an emergency existed at the time of signing that would excuse
his failure to read it, or that the opposite party misled him by an artifice
or device which prevented him from reading it, or that a fiduciary or
confidential relationship existed between the parties upon which he relied
in not reading the contract ....
[2] Code Ann. §37-707 defines confidential relations as follows: "Any
relations shall be deemed confidential, arising from nature or created by
law, or resulting from contracts, where one party is so situated as to
exercise a controlling influence over the will, conduct, and interest of
another; or where, from similar relation of -mutual confidence, the law
requires the utmost good faith; such as partners, principal and agent,
etc." . ..
[3] The relationships listed as examples in the statute are not exclusive, as shown by the use of the abbreviation "etc." and the phrase "where
one party is so situated." . . .11

The court adopted the view of the dissent in Coles v. Cates and held that:
The above Code Section does not attempt to comprehensively enumerate the cases wherein the relation of mutual confidence is present. . .The
showing of a relationship in fact which justifies the reposing of confidence
by one party in another is all the law requires.
In this case the relationship between the parties was employeremployee. This is not the type of relationship such as that of principal and
agent from which the law will necessarily imply confidentiality. Generally
the relationship between an employer and employee is that of arms-length
bargaining. This is not to say, however, that under a particular fact situation a confidential relationship can never exist between an employer and
his employee (e.g., an employer signing checks prepared by his secretarybookkeeper).
In the case before us there are facts" which could be shown by the
61. Id. at 305-06, 219 S.E.2d at 423.
62. The court suggested the pertinent facts as follows: "The plaintiff had worked for the
defendant Cochran for eight years. Part of the plaintiff's pay consisted of a house on the
defendant's farm, rent free. Plaintiff apparently trusted his employer to pay him whatever
wages were due to be paid. He may show that he was accustomed to relying on the defendant
for advice. The plaintiff claims that the defendant told him the insurance company would
pay all his medical bills as well as his lost wages. He arose from bed and signed the release
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plaintiff from which a jury could find a confidential relationship sufficient
to set aside the release . . .[Consequently, a] jury question exists as to
whether a confidential relationship existed such as would excuse the
plaintiff for relying on the representations of his employer."3
VI.

EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS

In Utica Tool Co. v. Mitchell, an oral contract of employment entered
into on October 23, 1973, called for the period of employment to commence
on or about November 1, 1973, and to extend for more than one year. The
court cited Ga. Code §20-401(5)1 5 and held the contract to be unenforceable
because of the statute of frauds. The court further held that:
The mere fact that he entered upon employment and served will not
avail as part performance . . .The part performance required to obviate
the Statute of Frauds must be substantial and essential to the contract
and which results in a benefit to one party and a detriment to the other
... . Thus it has been held in a similar case that a performance of
services under a contract for a part of the term is not such part performance as renders it a fraud upon the party performing for the employer to
refuse to comply, by a discharge of that party before the expiration of the
term. This is true notwithstanding the person performing the services,
after he entered into the contract and began to render services under it,
refused an offer of employment elsewhere."
In McClure v. Leasco Computer, Inc.,7 an agreement provided that the
employment began on October 1, 1973, but there was no specific language
indicating the time the agreement would run. The court reiterated the
principle to be applied with regard to employment contracts such as this
in the following language:
Where a person is hired to serve another without any agreement as to the
duration of service, there is no inflexible rule of law as to the length of time
the hiring is to continue. The question as to the length of time the hiring
is to continue will be governed by the circumstances of each particular
case. If one is hired to work in a crop being raised, the presumption is, in
the absence of circumstances showing a contrary intention, that his term
of service is to continue during the crop season. If one is hired to do general
at the defendant's request relying on the defendant's representation rather than reading the

document himself." Id. at 307-08, 219 S.E.2d at 424.
63. Id.
64. 135 Ga. App. 635, 218 S.E.2d 650 (1975).
65. GA. CODE ANN. §20-401(5) provides in part: "To make the following obligations binding on the promisor, the promise must be in writing, signed by the party to be charged
therewith . . .viz: (5) Any agreement . . .that is not to be performed within one year from

the

making thereof."

66.
67.

135 Ga. App. at 637, 218 S.E.2d at 652.
134 Ga. App. 871, 216 S.E.2d 689 (1975).
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service on a farm, the presumption is, in the absence of an agreement to
the contrary, or circumstances showing a contrary intention, that the term
of service is to continue for a year. The same rule applies to the hiring of
persons to do service in any business that requires constant labor. As this
rule is not inflexible, and may be controlled by circumstances, the circumstance of agreeing on weekly, monthly, quarterly or half-yearly payment
of wages may be sufficient of itself to create the presumption of a hiring
for the corresponding periods. But the circumstances of the hiring, though
no time is expressly agreed upon, may show that it was to continue for a
year, although the payment of wages was to occur monthly."
It then held:
The terminology of the instant contract, while not entirely free from
doubt, tends to indicate that the parties intended that the plaintiff be
hired for a period of at least one year. This is evidenced by the marketing
responsibilities which encompassed at least three months during which
the plaintiff must obtain a minimum amount of finance leases, further
evidenced by the use of the term "guaranteed annual income," and by the
set up for commissions which includes three months at $1,000.00 per
month, and the next six months at $335.00, with a draw after three
months.'

VII.

LIQUIDATED DAMAGES

In Military Armament Corp. v. ITT Terryphone Corp. ,0 a lease contract
provided for liquidated damages in the event of the customer's breach in
the amount of all unpaid rentals, other charges, costs, or expenses which
would become due immediately at termination of the lease, with interest
at 6% per annum until paid. The court held that the liquidated damages
for which the contract provided did not constitute a penalty under Georgia
Code §20-14037' and were valid and enforceable."

VIII.

REAL ESTATE COMMISSIONS

In Parrishv. Ragsdale Realty Co., Inc.," the court applied an established
rule to finder's-fee contracts in holding that a broker must be the procuring
cause in an eventual transaction in order to be entitled to a commission
68. Id. at 872-73, 216 S.E.2d at 691, quoting from Magarahan v. Wright & Lamkin, 83
Ga. 773, 777, 10 S.E. 584 (1889).
69. 134 Ga. App. at 873, 216 S.E.2d at 691.
70. 134 Ga. App. 694, 215 S.E.2d 724 (1975).
71. GA. CODE ANN. §20-1403 (1965).
72. For a similar result, see Hughes Motor Co. v. First National Bank of Atlanta, 136 Ga.
App. 295, 220 S.E.2d 782 (1975), where the court, following Military Armament, held that
when authorized by the contract, an acceleration of the entire rental price represents liquidated damages and does not constitute a penalty.
73. 135 Ga. App. 491, 218 S.E.2d 164 (1975).

19761

CONTRA CTS

therefor. Here, an owner listed property for sale with a broker, who procured a prospect, but the contemplated sale was not consummated, and
the parties in good faith broke off negotiations. The court held that the
broker was not entitled to a commission because he was not the procuring
cause of the ultimate transaction. Another case7" reiterated that a realestate broker's commission is not earned "until his principal, the owner,
makes an unconditional offer to sell and it is accepted by a purchaser found
by him." 7"
In Potts v. Smith,7" a real estate broker was required to return a binder
when the proposed buyer rescinded a contract containing the following
special stipulation: "This contract is contingent an [sic] subject to the
purchaser being able to refinance the loan in the amount of $200,000.00
that is presently held by Cameron & Brown Mortgage Company." The
court found the stipulation too indefinite to be enforceable and held that
the buyer was not estopped from rescinding the contract simply because
he had notified the broker prior to the repudiation that he had obtained a
loan commitment and had set a closing date for the transaction. The court
concluded: "If the parties to a transaction do not create binding agreements, the courts are powerless to do it for them, or to afford a remedy for
a breach.""
IX.

PRIVITY

In Parzini v. Center Chemical Co.,7" Parzini and two other restaurant
employees were injured while attempting to open a plastic bottle of drain
cleaner. The liquid, alleged to be almost pure sulphuric acid, squirted into
the air and fell on the plaintiff's head, severely burning and blinding him.
The court held, in part:
We are forced to the conclusion that to the extent that breach of an
implied warranty is a contract notion, the plaintiff, being an employee of
the purchaser rather than a "person who is in the family or household of
his buyer or who is a guest in his home" may not rely on express or implied
warranties of the manufacturer because of lack of privity. Code Ann.
§190A-2-318. For a remedy we must look to the action of the legislature,
not the courts. As was pointed out in Chaffin v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. [Citation omitted.] where a middleman was involved: "There
is once again a gap in the law between the manufacturer and a buyer who
74. Morgan v. Siegal, 135 Ga. App. 559, 218 S.E.2d 280 (1975).
75. Id. at 560, 218 S.E.2d at 281, quoting from Birchmore v. Upchurch, 78 Ga. App. 233,
50 S.E.2d 857 (1948).
76. 134 Ga. App. 737, 215 S.E.2d 697 (1975).
77. Id. at 738, 215 S.E.2d at 698, quoting from Scott v. Lewis, 112 Ga. App. at 197, 144
S.E.2d at 461.
78. 134 Ga. App. 414, 214 S.E.2d 700 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 234 Ga. 868, 218
S.E.2d 580 (1975).
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purchases from a wholesaler or retailer in the distributive chain." Here
there is a gap between the employee of the buyer and the wholesaler.79
X.

THEFT

BY CONVERSION OR BREACH OF CONTRACT?

In Baker v. State, 0 the defendant was convicted of two counts of theft
by conversion. He had entered into two contracts with third parties for the
construction of a dwelling house for each. Money was advanced to him and
he commenced construction on both houses but neither was completed.
Each of the contracting parties was required to pay off materialmen liens
for material furnished for the two projects which had not been paid by
defendant. The defendant was charged with converting a portion of the
funds advanced by each of the contracting parties. The defendant testified
to the effect that he had diligently tried to fulfill his contractual agreements but encountered unforeseen difficulties with a subcontractor and
that he at all times intended to complete the contracts. The court held:
Theft by conversion occurs when the defendant after lawfully receiving
funds from another under an agreement to make a specified application
of them, knowingly puts the money to his own use in violation of the
agreement. Code Ann. §26-1808. The purpose of the statute is to punish
for fraudulent conversion. The statute is not designed to punish for the
failure to comply with a contractual obligation. [Citation omitted.]
While it is undisputed that the defendant was advanced money to construct these homes and that he did not complete them there is not the
slightest inference that can be drawn from the evidence that any amount
of the money advanced was converted to his use. The state proved a
breach of contract but it failed to prove the offenses charged in the indictment. The evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to authorize the
conviction."'

At its 1976 session, the Georgia General Assembly enacted a new Code
section 2 relating to theft by conversion of payments for property improvements which provides:
Any architect, landscape architect, engineer, contractor, subcontractor,
or other person, who, with intent to defraud, shall use the proceeds of any
payment made to him on account of improving certain real property for
any other purpose than to pay for labor or service performed on, or materials furnished by his order for this specific improvement, while any amount
for which he may be or become liable for such labor, services, or materials
remains unpaid shall be guilty of a felony.
79.

Id. at 414, 214 S.E.2d at 701.

80.
81.
82.

Id. at 501, 218 S.E.2d at 172.

135 Ga. App. 500, 218 S.E.2d 171 (1975).
GA. CODE ANN. §26-1808.1 (1976).
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XI.

MISCELLANEOUS

Other cases decided during the period of this survey reaffirm the following rules of construction and well-established principles of contract law:
"[wihile a plaintiff may simultaneously sue upon theories of express contract and, alternately, implied contract [citations omitted], he cannot
recover on a quantum meruit where an express contract exists;" "[a]
guaranty as distinguished from a contract of suretyship, in which a person
obligates himself to pay the debt of another in consideration of credit or
indulgence or other benefit given to the principal, requires consideration
as a benefit flowing to the guarantor;"" 4 "[miere inadequacy of consideration alone will not void a contract;" 85 "[iln every case of breach of contract, the injured party is entitled to recover at the least nominal damages
which will carry the costs of the action.""
A statute enacted at the last session of the General Assembly provides
that a person of either sex must be at least 16 years of age to validly make
a contract for marriage."'
83. Venture Const. Co. v. Great American Mortgage Investors, 134 Ga. App. 440, 444, 214
S.E.2d 683, 686 (1975).
84. Friedland v. Citizens & Southern South DeKalb Bank, 135 Ga. App. 591, 218 S.E.2d
302, 303 (1975).
85. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Moulder, 137 Ga. App. 527, 529, 224 S.E.2d 435, 436 (1976),
quoting from GA. CODE ANN. §20-307 (1965).
86. Flanders v. Hill Aircraft & Leasing Corp., 137 Ga. App. 286, 289, 223 S.E.2d 482, 485
(1976).
87. Ga. Laws, 1976, p. 1719.

